Suriname places in Tier 3 of the ITU Global Cybersecurity Index 2024 — an establishing posture with measurable progress and identified gaps. No comprehensive data-protection statute is yet in force, and no designated supervisory authority is publicly identified in the IAPP Global Privacy Directory at this Edition. On the question of artificial intelligence policy, no national AI policy is yet registered in the OECD AI Policy Observatory; on the question of open-government practice, Suriname is not currently an Open Government Partnership member. Domestic data-center capacity is not currently surveyed by the Cushman & Wakefield and CBRE datasets at a level sufficient for ranking, and foundational digital identity coverage is not yet captured at a measurable level by the World Bank ID4D dataset.
With a composite of 25.9 out of 100, Suriname sits at rank 154th out of the 194 States surveyed in Edition 0. The country's strongest pillar at this Edition is Technical & Operational Safeguards, scoring 4.3 out of 10; its thinnest is Constitutional & Legal Foundation, at 0.7 out of 10. Within the Americas region, Suriname sits below the regional average composite of 43.4. The pillar pattern is the substantive material the Charter invites the State to engage with — neither a leaderboard position, nor a final verdict, but a structured picture of where the open-source record is full and where it remains to be built.
On the side of what helps: at this Edition the open-source record records limited established structural protections; the work of building those protections forward is the agenda of the Charter. On the side of what has not yet been done: the absence of a comprehensive data-protection statute leaves citizens without a coherent statutory floor; no designated supervisory authority is publicly identified at this Edition, leaving the institutional channel for enforcement underdeveloped; no national AI policy is yet registered in the OECD AI Policy Observatory, so the public baseline against which Article 6 might be tested has not been laid down; the capital-crime exception is not as narrowly framed as Article 4.3 of the Charter contemplates, so compulsory access to encrypted data is not yet bounded in a way the Charter would recognize; there is no public registry of access requests under the capital-crime exception, leaving the question of compulsory access opaque to citizens and to international observers.
The complete IDSI Edition 0 (2026) report — methodology, sources, sub-indicators for all 194 States.
Get the full IDSI Edition 0 (2026) reportStates, civil-society organizations, and individuals may request a re-evaluation of any entry. The Custodian commits to a written response within thirty days.
Request a re-evaluation of Suriname's entryWhat Suriname is currently doing on data sovereignty. The links below lead to government databases, international legal trackers, and contemporaneous news. They are the public record from which the Custodian’s scoring is drawn — and the starting point for any reader seeking to understand the country’s posture in depth.
All links open in a new tab. The Custodian does not control these third-party sites and is not responsible for their content. If you find a more authoritative government source for any item above, please let us know via the re-evaluation form below — we will update the page within thirty days.
Submissions are received under the standing Correction Notice protocol. Provide as much public-source detail as you can — the Custodian re-scores from open-source evidence, not from claim alone.
Standing Correction Notice — the State of Suriname may request, in writing, the publication of a corrected entry within thirty days of any factual error. Edition 0 entries are derived from the open-source record only; nothing on this page is offered as a verdict, and the Initiative welcomes engagement that improves accuracy.